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Abstract
Most problems faced by modern human society have two characteristics in common - they are tragedy-of-the-commons
type of problems, and they are global problems. Tragedy-of-the-commons type of problems are those where a commonly
shared resource is overexploited by free riders at the expense of everyone sharing the resource. The exploitation of global
resources such as clean air and water, political stability and peace, etc. underlies many of the most pressing human
problems. Punishment of free riding behavior is one of the most frequently used strategies to combat the problem, but the
spatial reach of sanctioning institutions is often more limited than the spatial effects of overexploitation. Here, we analyze a
general game theoretical model to assess under what circumstances sanctioning institutions with limited reach can
maintain the larger commons. We find that the effect of the spatial reach has a strong effect on whether and how the
commons can be maintained, and that the transitions between those outcomes are characterized by phase transitions. The
latter indicates that a small change in the reach of sanctioning systems can profoundly change the way the global commons
can be managed.
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Introduction
Many of the most pressing problems of human society are global
problems: environmental pollution, overpopulation, nuclear pro-
liferation, global warming, etc. At their core, most of these
problems present a tragedy-of-the-commons-like situation [1–5],
where the maintenance of a common good requires an effort by
everyone, but can easily be exploited by free-riders who benefit
from the common good without paying for the effort. For
example, clean natural resources in highly populated areas require
some forms of waste control - the associated costs are generally
shared by everyone in the area, but the benefits of the clean
resources are also shared by everyone in the area. The problem
arises when individuals start reaping the benefits of the resource
without sharing the costs. Because such free-riding behavior is
beneficial to the individual, the resource cannot be maintained in
the long run, hence the tragedy of the commons [6–9].
In order to prevent the tragedy of the commons caused by free-
riding behavior, a number of strategies have been proposed. In
particular, punishment of free-riding has received considerable
attention. In its simplest form, punishment emerges from
individuals who are willing to punish exploiters at a personal cost
to themselves. If the threat and cost of being punished are greater
than the potential gain from exploiting, such a simple sanctioning
system can temporarily maintain the commons [10–14]. However,
because the act of punishment is costly to the punisher,
punishment itself is susceptible to free-riding: individuals are best
off if they can benefit from the punisher’s efforts without having to
pay the cost of punishment themselves. This so-called ‘‘second-
order free rider problem’’ can in principle be addressed with the
punishment of non-punishers, but this will ultimately lead to an
‘‘n
th-order free rider problem’’ which cannot be solved by such a
simple sanctioning system [15,16] .
A more complex sanctioning system, where individuals
contribute to a punishment pool, rather than paying the cost of
punishment themselves, has shown to be a potential solution to this
dilemma. In such a ‘‘pool punishment’’ system, exploiters are
punished by an institution paid for by pool punishers [17,18].
Notably, the cost of paying into this punishment pool must be paid
even in the absence of exploiters (and thus in the absence of
punishment). This is in stark contrast to the ‘‘peer punishment’’
system described above, where costs in the absence of exploiters
are trivial. Another notable aspect about pool punishment is that it
is easy to identify those who do not contribute to the punishment
pool, and are thus second-order free riders. This allows pool
punishment to escape the ‘‘n
th-order free rider problem’’ and
maintain the commons despite the apparent inefficiency caused by
the continuous costs that accrue even in the absence of exploiters
[19,20]. Indeed, institutionalized punishment of exploiters has
been implemented on various levels of societal organization,
ranging from so-called committees of vigilance in the American
Old West to modern international criminal tribunals [21–23].
As the commons of the 21st century have become increasingly
global (e.g. global climate change, global health, international
terrorism), a problem of scale has emerged [24]. While
exploitation of the commons now has far-reaching consequences
across international borders, the reach of institutions sanctioning
exploiters has not always kept pace. For example, local emission of
greenhouse gases can have far-reaching consequences for the
global climate, but international consensus on emission standards -
and on the sanctioning of violations thereof - has been largely
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ability of sanctioning systems to govern the commons is not well
understood. Building on earlier work using spatial evolutionary
game theory, [26–28] we show that the type of sanctioning system
that can be stably maintained depends strongly on the reach of the
sanctioning system relative to the reach of the commons. Most
importantly, we observe phase transitions between the dominant
strategies such that small changes in the reach of the sanctioning
systems can have profound impacts on how the commons are (or
are not) protected against exploitation.
Results
To investigate the effect of sanctioning systems with limited
reach, we consider a spatial environment with a total of M players
on a square lattice with M cells (implemented as a torus), where
each player occupies a cell. We assume that the players do not
move between games. Players can participate in a game if they are
no more than an interaction distance pi away from a focal player.
To play a game, players can contribute and receive from the
commons as described above. Punishers can only punish other
participants that are no more than a punishment distance pp away
from the punishing player. Since the game is non-compulsory,
players are given the option to stay out of the game and instead
receive a payoff s. The probability that two randomly chosen
players of a game are able to punish each other is parameterized as
a coverage coefficient Cc, which can be calculated as
CC~
1
d jj
  
1
d jj {1
   X
i~d
X
j~d
i=j
a(i,j), ð1Þ
where d is a set of players within the interaction range of the
initiating player, and a(i,j) is one if and only if the distance between
players i and j is less than or equal to pp and zero otherwise. From
this we can calculate the effective values of b, b, g and c such that
b9=bC C, b9=b, g9=gC C, and c9=c CC. Note that the cost paid
by pool punishers is unmodified because they contribute to the
punishing pool even when there are no defectors within their
punishment range.
From this, we can now determine under what circumstances the
commons can be maintained by punishment (without punishers,
cooperators would always be invaded by defectors). In a non-
compulsory game, defectors will always be invaded by non-
participants [29]. In the case of first-order punishment, both peer
punishers and pool punishers can invade non-participants.
However, since we assume b.0, pool punishers have a lower
payoff than the other cooperating strategies and thus can be
invaded by cooperators or peer punishers. Then, defectors can
invade a population of peer punishers if
CCv
(czc)=(M{Nz1)zr
(N{1)g
: ð2Þ
Under this condition, the benefit from not contributing to the
commons is greater than the cost of being punished. Thus, every
strategy can be invaded by another strategy, and cooperation
cannot be maintained (Figure 1A, zone 1, and Figure 2A). If the
condition is not met, however, the commons can be maintained by
peer punishment (Figure 1A, zone 2, and Figure 2B).
In the case of second-order punishment, peer punishment is
ineffective as long as (2) holds. Pool punishers have to pay b even if
they are not currently punishing any players, and thus they can be
invaded as long as
CCv
c=(M{Nz1)zrzb
(N{1)b
: ð3Þ
In this case, pool punishers are unable to maintain the commons
(Figure 1B, zone 3 and 4, and Figure 2C). If the condition is not
met, however, the commons can be maintained by pool
punishment (Figure 1B, zone 5, and Figure 2E). It then follows
that peer punishers can maintain the commons for intermediate
values of CC when
(czc)=(M{Nz1)zr
(N{1)g
vCCv
c=(M{Nz1)zrzb
(N{1)b
ð4Þ
If we assume that punishment costs are identical in both
punishment systems (i.e. g=b), the range of CC for which (4) can
be met will be non-zero (Figure 1B, zone 4, and Figure 2D). Thus,
under some circumstances, peer punishment can maintain the
commons even if second order punishment by pool punishers is
permitted.
Discussion
We’ve presented here a simple model of a spatial public goods
game to address the problem of scale that has emerged as many of
the most pressing issues facing modern societies have become
global. While the simplicity of the model cannot capture every
detail of the real world complexities inherent to governing the
commons, it allows us to formalize the effects of some key
parameters that are common to all sanctioning institutions, such as
the costs associated with punishment. In particular, as can be seen
from Eq. (4), in order for pool punishment to emerge under even
small values of CC, b should be small whereas b should be large.
That is, in order to protect the global commons with non-global
sanctioning systems, the contribution cost to a sanctioning
institution should be minimized while the costs imposed on non-
cooperators should be maximized [9]. Thus, the model can
replicate our intuition about the incentive structure of sanctioning
systems. However, through the addition of spatial constraints,
unexpected threshold phenomena emerge such that small changes
in the system can lead to the fundamental changes. For example,
inequalities (2)–(4) demonstrate how small changes in CC can have
profound effects on whether the commons can be maintained, and
if so, by which type of sanctioning system. Furthermore, while
previous work has argued that peer punishment is outcompeted by
pool punishment when second order punishment is permitted
[19], our results indicate that peer punishment wins when the
reach of the sanctioning system is intermediate relative to the size
of the commons, a situation that is likely to be relevant in many
applications. Future work may extend this model to include the
effect of rewards on cooperation [30].
As we’ve shown above, in order to protect the global commons
from exploitation, the reach of sanctioning institutions must be
sufficiently long. This observation also holds for commons that are
limited in size (i.e. where pi,‘) (Figure 3). Overall, the commons
always benefits from sanctioning institutions with long reach.
Materials and Methods
We developed a simple model implementing a spatial public
goods game that reflects the fundamental dilemma of the tragedy
of the commons. A public goods game models individuals’
contributions to the common good. Specifically, each player is
Governing the Global Commons
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contributions are then multiplied by a constant and evenly divided
amongst the other players. Because a player receives the same
amount regardless of its own donation, a rational player would not
contribute to the commons. More formally: in each game, an
initial focal player is selected randomly. Then a set of N-1 other
players that are no more than an interaction distance pi away from
the focal player partake in a game with the focal player. In this
model, a player cooperates by donating an amount c to a
commons. This donation is then multiplied in value by a factor r
and evenly distributed to the rest of the participants [7]. A
defecting (non-cooperating) player does not contribute to the
commons, but still receives the same benefit as all the other
players. Thus, in a compulsory game, without any form of
punishment, cooperation would quickly deteriorate. In a non-
compulsory game, a rock-paper-scissors–like cycle of non-partic-
ipants, cooperators, and defectors emerges, where phases of
cooperation are short-lived [29,31,32]. We allow punishment to
take two forms, peer or pool punishment [19]. Peer punishers
devote resources to directly punish defectors themselves [33],
whereas pool punishers devote resources to a punishment pool that
pays for institutionalized punishment upfront [17].
Playing the Game
We begin by defining a very basic public good game where all of
the N players cooperate by contributing c which is then multiplied
by a constant r and equally divided among the other players. In
this case, all players will receive a payoff of
(n{1)cr
n{1
{c ð5Þ
We allow for the possibility of players not contributing to the pool,
and thus being defectors. Each defector receives the same amount
from the resource pool as a cooperator does, but without paying to
donate to the pool. Thus in a game with X
Figure 1. The Effects of CC on Strategy Frequency. Results of the mathematical model show that there are phase transitions between different
zones of strategy distributions when CC is varied in games with only first order punishment (A) and in games with second order punishment (B).
Punishment is ineffective in zones 1 and 3. Peer punishment is effective in zones 2 and 4, and pool punishment is only effective in zone 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034051.g001
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XzY{1
ð6Þ
cooperators and Y defectors, a defector will receive a payoff of ,
and a cooperator will receive a payoff of ,
(X{1)cr
XzY{1
{c, ð7Þ
Furthermore, we allow for a player to not participate in the game
at all and to receive a payoff of s instead of the part of the resource
pool that a player would otherwise receive [6]. We will assume that
a participant will be forced to be a non-participant if there are no
other participants within the group that it is attempting to play
with. Given a world with X cooperators, Y defectors, and Z
nonparticipants, the probability that a participant will not be able
to play with any other players is
Z
N{1
  
XzYzZ{1
N{1
   : ð8Þ
Note that if X+Y.1, there is a non-zero probability of a game
taking place, and it is assumed that a game will take place given a
sufficient number of attempted games.
Peer Punishment
We will now allow for the possibility of peer punishment. A peer
punisher is a cooperator that fines every defector that it plays with
a penalty g. To engage in this punishment, a peer punisher must
pay c per defector punished. In a game with X cooperators, Y
defectors, and W peer punishers, a cooperator will receive a payoff
of
(WzX{1)cr
WzXzY{1
{c, ð9Þ
a defector will receive a payoff of
(WzX)cr
WzXzY{1
{gW, ð10Þ
and a peer punisher will receive a payoff of
(WzX{1)cr
WzXzY{1
{c{cY: ð11Þ
Figure 2. Examples of the Population Dynamics. Computational simulations of populations with parameters representative of zones 1 through
5 in Figure 1. In (A) and (C), the reach of the sanctioning systems is not far enough to have any effect, and the population can cycle through all of the
strategies. In panel (B) and (D), peer punishment is able to stop an invasion of defectors, but does not stop non-punishing cooperation from drifting
in. Once there are sufficiently few peer punishers, defectors can invade. Second order pool punishment is able to stop the invasion of non-punishing
cooperation, hence pool punishment becomes locked in panel (E). Color code as in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034051.g002
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cooperators, because regular cooperators do not contribute to the
second order common good of punishing defectors. However, we
assumed that at most two strategies exist at any time. In a world of
non-punishing cooperators and peer punishers, there will not be
any defectors, so the behavior of a non-punishing cooperator will
be the same as a peer punisher. Thus, peer punishers would be
unable to differentiate between other peer punishers and non-
punishing cooperators making second order peer punishment
impracticable [19].
Pool Punishment
We can also allow for pool punishment. A pool punisher
contributes b each round to maintain a punishment pool. This
punishment pool then fines every defector by amount b for every
pool punisher the defector cheats. If a game is played with V pool
punishers, W peer punishers, X cooperators, and Y defectors, a
pool punisher will receive a payoff of
(VzWzX{1)cr
VzWzXzY{1
{c{b, ð12Þ
a peer punisher will receive a payoff of
(VzWzX{1)cr
VzWzXzY{1
{c{cY, ð13Þ
a cooperator will receive a payoff of
(VzWzX{1)cr
VzWzXzY{1
{c, ð14Þ
and a defector will receive a payoff of
(VzWzX)cr
VzWzXzY{1
{gW{bV: ð15Þ
Unlike peer punishment, there is a noticeable difference between
pool punishers and other cooperators even in the absence of
defectors. This allows for pool punishers to engage in second order
punishment. We can account for second order punishment by
simply subtracting bV from (13) and (14). Since peer punishers can
differentiate between pool punishers and themselves, it is possible
that peer punishers can engage in second order punishment of
pool punishers also. However, this does not effect the dynamics.
Population Dynamics
Consider two players i and j with payoffs Pi and Pj. We can use a
simple social learning function
1
1ze
{s(Pj{PI) ð16Þ
to define the probability that player i will imitate player j. We will
assume that each player will randomly choose another player to
consider updating. Note that if sR‘, player i will always imitate
player j when Pj.Pi, and player i will imitate player j with a 50%
probability when Pj=P i. Otherwise, player i will not imitate player
j. Furthermore, a player may randomly switch to a new strategy
with a probability m. We will assume that m is small enough that
mutation is rare and likely to occur only when the population’s
strategies are uniform [34,35].
Now consider a world with M players where M–1players have
the same strategy, and one player has a new strategy. As before,
the players divide into groups of N players to play a game. After
these games have been played, a player is chosen to update using
(16). We can model the frequency of the new strategy using a birth
and death process [36]. Clearly, the states where there are either
zero or M players with the new strategy are absorbing states. The
Figure 3. Strategy Frequencies for Non-Global Games. Results from the mathematical model (semi-transparent) and computational
simulations (non-transparent) for non-global games with only first order punishment (A) and with second order punishment allowed (B). Note the
similar phase transitions in non-global games. Color code as in Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034051.g003
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population is the probability that the random walk reaches the
latter state. We define this probability as PiRj.
For a new strategy to invade a world with M players that have
the same strategy, one of the players must first mutate into the new
strategy, then that strategy must replace the other M–1 players’
strategies as shown above. In our model, there are a total of 5
strategies, so the probability that a mutation will result in a specific
strategy is 1/4. From this, we can build a 5 state Markov chain
where each state represents a uniform
Pi,j~
1
4Pi?j i=j
1{
P 5
k~1
k=i
Pi?k i~j
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
ð17Þ
population of a specific strategy, and the transition probabilities
are defined as
We can then take the limiting distribution of the chain to find
the long term average frequency of each of the strategies [20].
The Coverage Coefficient
Given a location and a play distance, we can find a set d of
players in that area. The N players that will play together are
randomly chosen from this set. However, some of these players
may not be within the punishment distance PP of each other, so
their ability to punish will be lowered. The probability CC that two
players randomly chosen from the set are able to punish each
other is
1
d jj
  
1
d jj {1
   X
i[d
X
j[d
j=i
a(i,j), ð18Þ
Where a(i, j) is one if the euclidian distance between players i and j
is less than PP and zero otherwise. Since the two players are not
always able to punish each other, their effective values of b, b, g
and c are
b
0
~CCb
b
0
~CCb
g
0
~CCg
c
0
~CCc:
ð19Þ
Note that the amount pool punishers pay to maintain the
punishment pool is unchanged because they must donate every
round even if they do not punish any players. Thus pool
punishment becomes less efficient as CC decreases.
Phase Transitions
Regardless of whether second order punishment is allowed, we
see a sharp transition from a fairly even spread of strategies to peer
punishers being the dominant strategy. This transition occurs
because peer punishment is unable to prevent the invasion of
defectors when CC is below the a certain point. Let us begin with a
single defector trying to invade a population of peer punishers. If
we assume that M is much larger than N, it is unlikely that the
defector will try to imitate one of the players it cheated, but instead
a peer punisher who’s payoff was not lowered because of being
cheated or having to pay to punish. The cheated peer punishers
are also more likely to consider imitating someone other than the
defector. If there is more than one defector, the probability of
imitating a player that is not a defector or has not been cheated
goes down, and defectors have an easier time spreading. Thus, the
ability of peer punishers to sufficiently punish the initial defector
determines which side of the phase transition the game is on. By
combining (10) and (11) and using the effective parameters defined
in (19), we can show that this transition occurs at
CC~
(czc)=(M{Nz1)zr
(N{1)g
: ð20Þ
When second order punishment is permitted, another phase
transition is observed. This transition is at a higher level of CC and
separates the values of CC where pool punishers are able to stop
defectors from invading and where they are not. The reason that
this transition happens at a higher value of CC than the one for
peer punishers is because all pool punishers contribute to
punishment, whereas only peer punishers that are actively
punishing have their payoffs lowered. As with (20), we can use
(12), (15) and (19) to show that this transition occurs at
CC
c=(M{Nz1)zrzb
(N{1)b
: ð21Þ
We observe that peer punishers dominate the second order game
for medium values of CC.
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